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For the public health worker the history of the control of Aedes aegypti-borne
diseases offers a very sobering lesson. Our forebears were considerably more successful
and , let's face the truth, more competent in the management and prosecution of a technical
control service than we. All this competence is in the relatively recent past. Brazil,
which had experienced recurrent severe epidemics of yellow fever, proposed to the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) in 1947 that it undertake a campaign to eradicate
Aedes aegypti from the Western Hemisphere (1). Dr. Fred L. Soper, during the period of
this eradication campaign, was the PAHO Director. During the 1930's Soper, as a
Foundation officer, had inadvertently discovered that a highly organized program to find
and destroy aegypti larval breeding sites could reduce premises indices to zero (2). The
addition of specially qualified teams designated to find "hidden foci" of breeding were
responsible for eradicating Aedes aegypti in Brazil. This was before the discovery of DDT,
and when oil, Paris Green, the pyrethrins and sulfur smoke were the only available
larvicides or adulticides.
Certainly, the conditions for breeding mosquitoes in urban areas in the era of the
1930's to 1960's could not have been better than today. Under these circumstances, Soper
and a cohort of country managers organized and carried out successful campaigns which
eradicated aegypti as shown in Table 1. Can we attribute this success to unparailed
leadership? To an era of governments run by strong men? To an epoch when sanitary
reforms were being invented and implemented as a matter of course?
Wemaynever know.
Whatever the case, soon after Dr. Soper's retirement, the United States abandoned
its eradication program in 1969. There followed a general decline in political interest in
Aedes aegypti control. Rather quickly, the mosquito was exported from the United States
throughout the Americas, becoming re-established in the 1970's and through the 1980's.
Meanwhile, outside the Western Hemisphere, the Aedes aegypti situation was stead-
ily deteriorating. The factors most responsible for the increase in Aedes aegypti and the
growing 20th century dengue pandemic have been identified many times : World War II
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Table 1. PAHO eradication program for Aedes aegypti completed
DATE I COUNTRY
September-October 1958 Bolivia, Brazil, British Honduras, Canal
Zone, Ecuador, French Guiana, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay
S eptember 1959 | Guatemala, Honduras
A ugust 1960 | El Salvador
O ctober 1961 I Chile, Costa Rica
S eptember 1963 | Mexico
September-October 1965 Argentina
C ompiled from the data from the the PAHO Resolutions, 1971.
Note : This Table represents only the dates at which initial eradication programs were com-
pleted, and does not show which areas later became reinfested.
From Slosek (4)
d estroyed urban infrastructures resulting in a great increase in domestic water storage.
The war also introduced large numbers of susceptible human beings into the dengue
-endemic zone and which created refugees who, themselves, assembled temporary struc-
tures which provided breeding sites for Aedes aegypti ; the post-war population explosion,
which more than quadrupled the population of tropical Asia ; the migration of people from
rural to urban locations ; and the steady deterioration of urban habitats.
Beyond these macrophenomena, I believe we can recognize failures in societal and
health system organization which prevented the creation of effective vector control ser-
vices or which led to the deterioration of such services. These include :
1. Failure to recruit and retain professional competence. Many national health systems
either have not created an adequate number of attractive positions for vector control
specialists or cannot provide career incentives which permit retention of skilled profes-
sionals.
2. Failure to staff vector control programs with adequate number of trained professionals
at an appropriate disciplinary mix. There is little recognition that vector control teams
require a mix of administrative, entomological, biological, epidemiological and communica-
tive skills.
3. Failure to apply sound managerial and scientific practices to vector control programs,
including the appropriate use of research to monitor and evaluate program outcomes.
4. Failure to train high quality professionals. As has been documented in an extensive
recent study by Gratz (3), opportunities for graduate-level education and research in vector
control are nearly absent in a region which holds a fifth of the world's population and beats
a large number of well-established and high quality universities and research institutes.
5. Failure to provide adequate funding. Inadequate application of pesticides may hasten
the emergence of resistance in mosquitoes making control problems worse. No program
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maydo less harm than a poorly conceived one.
6. Failure to obtain public consent and legislative sanctions for vector control programs.
1, Failure of political will. Underlying each of the above has been a permeating, self
-defeating expectation of failure at the budgeting, legislative, planning and execution
stages of vector control programs.
The global and national forces and systemic problems which have been identified
have contributed to a 20th century dengue pandemic and a fatal sub-epidemic of DHF/DSS
which is its consequence. In 1987, the Rockefeller Foundation, which had been identified
with the development of methods which led to the near eradication of Aedes aegypti in the
Western Hemisphere, wondered if the time had come to find new methods of vector
control. A meeting of vector control experts was called at the Parsons Island Conference
Center in Chesapeake Bay. The conferees agreed that, whether for political, cultural or
technical reasons, top-down, governmentally organized and administered programs could
not be expected to succeed as the only approach to vector control in the modern era. A
newstrategy was needed which builds from the bottom-up, deriving from the consent and
voluntary participation of the population at risk.
At the same time or before the Foundation's initiative, many others had advocated
and practiced community-based vector control. As the DHF/DSS problem has escalated,
the number of community-based Aedes aegypti control strategies, research and demonstra-
tion programs has increased. The strategies and science underlying this movement have
not always been clear. In the interest of opening a dialog, the origin, strategy, history,
successes and failures of the still-young governments of Mexico and Honduras, Rockefeller
Foundation, Centers for Disease Control, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public
Health program will be presented and discussed. -,
Rockefeller Foundation Program
STRATEGY -The Foundation's program was created around the concept of integrating
community-based control methods into standard national vector control programs. To do
this, it was decided to define the minimal composition of a vector control team. Such a
team should be composed of a team leader (preferably, an entomologist), a program
administrator, an epidemiologist and a social scientist. To train such a team it was
decided to provide a year-long didactic interdisciplinary educational experience (MPH at
Johns Hopkins) and a year-long field training program in Puerto Rico. The latter was
supervised by the staff of the San Juan Dengue Laboratory of CDC's Vector-Borne Disease
Control Division. Following their training, teams were to return home to designated study
sites where they would test interventions directed at or organized by communities.
Interventions which produced reliable reductions in breeding sites or larval indices were to
be evaluated for scale-up to national level.
HISTORY-In the summerof 1988, the governments of Mexico and Honduras nominated
candidates for training. In May 1989, Dean D. A. Henderson awarded Master of Health
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S ciences degrees to nine graduates in a ceremony held in San Juan, Puerto Rico. During
their formal training the fellows took a core curriculum including International Health,
Epidemiology, Computing, Biostatistics, Health Policy and Management, Entomology and
Social Sciences. Persons designated as team managers took additional entomology train-
ing ; social scientist-designees had enriched training in social science and program admin-
istrators, took additional management training.
At the very outset, the program encountered two problems. First, only physicians
were in the selection pool as candidates for training. Entomologists and social scientists
were simply not available. Second, candidates did not come from guaranteed positions in
national health ministries.
In May 1989, the Mexican and Honduran teams established residence in the Puerto
Rican towns of Caguas and Ponce, respectively. There the teams took part in an evalua-
tion of a new grade school curriculum on dengue and Aedes aegypti. This featured
homework assignments to identify and destroy larval breeding sites. Entomological
surveys done in pupil's households before and after teaching sessions revealed no signifi-
cant reduction in the number of containers which might potentially breed Aedes aegypti.
Nor were larval breeding sites or the density of breeding reduced. This was an important
lesson because it is often assumed that teaching, learning and behavior are connected.
The children scored well on knowledge tests, but, significant behavior modification could
not be detected.
Next, the teams organized de-novo interventions ; the Hondurans organized a
Project Head Start community teach-in. This ended with a small fiesta and a radio talk
show. The Mexicans organized a photonovella. This community written drama linked
failure clean-up patio to a case of dengue hemorrhagic fever. Each of these two interven-
tions were tested with pre- and post-intervention entomological surveys. These showed
modest but significant reductions in the disposable containers which could serve as
breeding sites for Aedes aegypti.
The teams learned an essential entomological lesson : that pre- and post-interven-
tion studies require a carefully selected control site where no intervention is undertaken (or
a shamintervention is carried out) but a pre-and post-entomological survey is done. In
several surveys there were dramatic reductions in the number of potential and actual
breeding sites between the first and second survey. But, these were due to seasonal
changes or, on one occasion, to a holiday which had prompted an annual clean-up.
Finally, the Mexican team invented a new house index which is particularly useful
in community-based mosquito control studies. Now called the Maya Index, it describes
mosquito breeding in three types of containers ; disposable, non-disposable but control-
lable, non-disposable and non-controllable. By "disposable" is meant containers which, in
the view of the householder, have no value and could be discarded. Up to 80% of all
potential breeding sites were disposable e. g., tin cans, plastic bottles, glass bottles, broken
plastic or glass objects, rubber tires and so forth. Non-disposable containers from which
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A edes aegypti breeding could be prevented included ceramic jars, containers holding water
plants, and traps, tubs, animal feeding dishes and so forth : Each of these containers might
either be emptied of water and inverted, or periodically emptied of water and, in the case
of large containers, scrubbed to remove adherent mosquito eggs. Non-disposable, non
-controllable containers are those which require professional identification and attention.
These include roof gutters, plant axils, bamboo ends, tree holes and other hidden breeding
sites.
In Mexico and Honduras, where they have been since July 1990, the teams are
working in the cities of Merida and El Progreso, respectively. Merida, a city of 300,000,
is the capital of Yucatan State and located near the Caribbean on the Northwest coast of
the Yucatan peninsula. El Progreso, a town of 50,000, is a few kilometers from San Pedro
Sula, near the Caribbean on the east coast of Honduras. El Progreso is in an area of rapid
growth and industrialization ; Merida is a commercial and tourist center, heavily populat-
ed by the descendants of Mayan Indians.
Both groups have invested studies on copepods as a mechanism of low cost vector
control. These insects are thought to be accessible to use by the general population. The
Mexican team has largely used drama to teach about Aedes aegypti breeding with lessons
designed for primary school children. Special scripts have been written for the Yucatan
puppet theater and shown on local television. In Honduras, an extensive community
network has been developed and, using health volunteers, an integrated, multi-disciplinary
program aimed at cholera, malaria and dengue control has been mounted. In this program
the emphasis is on improvement of compounds, streets, sewage systems and water supply.
Specific interventions have been designed to test health volunteer and household compli-
ance with the introduction and maintenance of copepods to control Aedes aegypti breeding
in water standing in wash tubs.
CRITIQUE -In neither country did economic or political conditions permit the composi-
tion of vector control teams as they had been designed. In Honduras, three of the team
memberssecured assignments in the health ministry. One memberworks full-time at the
El Progreso study site and heads the community-based dengue control project. One
memberheads the national vector control program and the other has an important
administrative position. The lack of an entomologist and a social scientist has been a
serious problem. Entomological input into study design and execution has not achieved
the standard of excellence required for a research project. Social scientists heve been
recruited from the University of San Pedro Sula. While this has provided scientists who
enjoy familiarity with the Honduran milieu, the kind of broad-gaged individual that had
been visualized as a member of an interdisciplinary vector control team has not yet been
found. This group has not yet mastered research which permits the testing of discreet
educational or social science interventions for their impact on mosquito breeding or on the
number of containers providing possible breeding sites for Aedes aegypti. It remains to be
determined if these problems can or will be solved in the future.
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In Mexico, the ability to integrate graduates from the training program into the
national health service was particularly poor. One of the five graduates serves as assis-
tant to the Deputy Secretary of Health located in Mexico City. Two graduates are full
-time faculty members of University of Yucatan, Where they run a dengue diagnostic and
research laboratory. This husband and wife team directs the community-based dengue
control program in Merida. Two other graduates, an entomologist from the University of
Chiapas and a physician from the school of medicine at Guadalajara, have left the program
entirely. To compensate for these losses entomologists and biologists from the University
of Monterrey have joined the vector control research project. Unfortunately, it has not
been possible to assemble a complete team in Merida. The most important gaps include
a team leader and an entomologist. For all practical purposes this has meant that
intervention research as such has not been designed or tested. As in Honduras, social
scientists have been recruited from the local university.
A cursory review of the literature on community-based control of Aedes aegypti
demonstrates an almost complete absence of carefully designed and tightly executed
intervention studies. This is particularly unfortunate since pre- and post-intervention
entomological surveys offer an objective and highly quantitative measure of behavioral
outcomes relating to mosquito breeding. Thus far, community-based control programs
appear to be centered on process, on goal setting and on good intentions. There is no more
unforgiving judge of the intensity and completeness of source reduction campaigns than the
gravid female Aedes aegypti. Humans who hope to defeat this formidable foe must learn
to be equally dispassionate and disciplined in assessing the outcome of vector control
activities.
Conclusions
Any possible success in community-based vector control programs will require a
careful description of and agreement on a set of short and long term objectives.
SHORT TEAM GOALS'-The near-term objective of community-based Aedes aegypti
control programs is to design messages, or develop and test behavior-modifying interven-
tions which will shift a significant portion of source reduction from the public sector to the
private householder. Community-based control programs should not be designed to
replace national, provincial or district vector control programs or displace leadership from
the public sector to the "community." "Community-based" should be interpreted as
community-participation. In testing interventions, care should be taken to assess the
length of time, or the number of times any particular intervention can be implemented
successfully. "Burn-out" is likely to be a serious problem, particularly if early interven-
tions are reasonably successful. Also, the disappearance of a health problem can signifi-
cantly reduce incentives to participate in meaningful source reduction activities.
LONG TERMGOALS-The real value of sustained efforts to educate a population on risk
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avoidance is to "redefine the unacceptable." It is this shift in public opinion which
provides a mandate to leaders. When the general public regards as "unacceptable" the
breeding of disease-bearing mosquitoes in and around homes, many options for the control
of mosquitoes will become available. One option is the model provided by the New
Orleans Control Board which was formed in response to public pressure to reduce nuisance
mosquitoes in the New Orleans area. An efficient year-round professionally managed
vector control program funded from tax revenues has kept New Orleans relatively
mosquito-free for more than 25 years. Perhaps a better model is the California mosquito
-abatement districts in which taxpayers provide funds to hire private sector vector control
firms who bid competitively for annual mosquito abatement contracts. Those companies
which perform the best work are rewarded and survive.
It will be evident that health messages and widely held preferences for risk abate-
ment require sensitive and compliant political systems. When the day comes that politi-
cians run for office on their pledges to improve public health and when an electorate holds
public officials responsible for redeeming their pledges, then is the time when "unaccepta-
ble" conditions will be changed to improve human health. It is in this way that health
education messages can be transformed into "political will." In democracies, it is possible
that the expressed wishes of communities can be translated into national-scale programs.
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